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There is an integrated global capital network, whose movements and vari- 
able logic ultimately determine economies and influence societies. This net- 
work of networks of capital both unifies and commands specific centres of 
capitalist accumulation, structuring behaviour of capitalists around their 
submission to the global network.1 
For the last ten years, both Presidents Menem and de la Rua have listened 
only to international finance capital and its powerful local representatives. 
Argentina needs a complete change of political regime. Institutions can no 
longer serve simply as executors of the orders of the minority capitalist sec- 
tor, which has not hesitated to demand the cruellest of sacrifices of the 
people, and to portray their suffering as the only solution. Argentina needs 
a new kind of relation between politics and economy, between government 
and capitalism.2 
In 2001, the world witnessed a financial catastrophe on an order not even 
considered possible since the creation of the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and international currency exchange standards - 
the key institutions of the current global financial order-at Bretton 
Woods in 1946. In December 2001, Argentina suspended payments on its 
$132 billion international debt, garnering the dubious distinction of 
unleashing the largest national debt default in history. In the preceding 
decade, several countries had teetered on the verge of bankruptcy- 
including Russia, Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia-but 
all were brought back from the brink to  a t  least temporary solvency by 
joint massive injections of cash from the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, the US government and interested transnational private 
banks, largely to  preserve the return on  their capital already invested in 
these countries. 
However, this time the International Monetary Fund refused to make 
its scheduled loan payment of $1.8 billion to the Argentinean govern- 
ment, citing a lack of viable long term economic planning as a justifica- 
tion, despite the fact that the loan installment would have ended up back 
in the hands of international creditors as it would only have been used to 
service interest payments on Argentina's cumulative debt. (It is worth not- 
ing that most "developing" countries, including Argentina, are charged 
interest rates of between 16 and 25% for international loans, while the 
prime rate in most "developed" economies hovers around 2%). This 
refusal of even a self-interested rescue operation for Argentina by the 
international institutions of global finance capital regulation signalled a 
drastic change in their long established double mandate of emergency 
intervention to preserve short-term monetary stability and of financing 
long term growth. Their new millennium mandate, still not fully or 
overtly articulated and apparently increasingly influenced by US interests, 
seems to be a simplistic and moralistic one of punishment. As US Trea- 
sury Secretary Paul O'Neill stated in his assessment of the Argentina crisis 
"They've been in trouble on and off for 70 years or more. They don't 
have any export industry to speak of. And they like it that way. Nobody 
forced them to be what they are."3 As a result of this brutal new manifes- 
tation of neo-liberal free market ideology, an entire nation of over 37 mil- 
lion people fell into economic collapse and political chaos. 
Even before Argentina was quarantined by and from international 
finance capital networks after defaulting on its debt payments, the Argen- 
tinean state had taken drastic internal measures in an attempt sustain 
itself as the value of its primary asset-debt-collapsed. In the months 
leading up to the December crisis, President de la Rua, head of a Radical 
Party-led alliance, had appointed Domingo Cavallo as his Minister of the 
Economy in an attempt to salvage the looming economic disaster. Cavallo 
had been at the centre Argentina's financial structure for decades, serving 
as head of the Central Bank under the military dictatorship from 1976 to 
1983 and then under President Menem from 1989 to 1999. Now in an 
even more powerful position, Cavallo developed and implemented sweep- 
ing banking system restrictions on December 3-including limits on bank 
withdrawals of $500 per month and suspension of international asset 
transfers-to stem the flight of capital out of the country. It is estimated 
that $1 billion in cash was squired out of Argentina the day before these 
controls were announced and that $60 billion in liquid assets were expa- 
triated in the three months prior to the collapse. The Argentinean econ- 
omy was completely demonetarized; there was no circulating cash, only 
circulating debt. The disappearance of hard currency quickly worked its 
way down to the most local and essential financial transactions, like buying 
food, provoking panic in an already exasperated population where the 
unemployment rate was 18% and those who had jobs rarely if ever got paid. 
Predictably, the people of Argentina exploded in social protest. During 
the night of December 14, spontaneous looting of supermarkets broke out 
in various parts of Rosario, a provincial capital in the north. What was 
taken from the stores in this rebellion is revealing: essentials, such as veg- 
etables, meat, soap. The province of Rosario was $140 million in debt 
and financial transfers from Buenos Aires had ceased; provincial employ- 
ees-nurses, teachers, police-had not been paid for months and now had 
no hope of receiving their wages. Antonio Bonfatti, head of Rosario's 
municipal council, sounded a horrified historical alarm, recalling the mil- 
itary dictatorship: "This is just a continuation of what started in 1976. 
Only the people doing it have ~hanged ."~  Political economist Atilio Boron 
expanded this perception in his visceral historical overview: 
This is the end of the cycle of neo-liberal hegemony in Argentina's public 
life. This quarter century long stage extends from the dying moments of 
Isabel Peron's government to  today. The principal ideologue of this project 
which launched the rise of speculative capital to a position of complete 
command of the economy was Jose Martinez de Hoz, "superminister" of 
the military dictatorship; his eager student and successor-Domingo Cav- 
allo-has continued this effort for two decades under three different gov- 
ernments, starting with the military dictatorship.5 
After the first incidents of looting on December 14, unrest peaked on the 
night of December 19, when demonstrations, riots and supermarket looting 
spread across Argentina. Millions of Argentineans poured into and stayed in 
the streets, despite de la Rua's declaration of a State of Emergency and a 
military enforced curfew. Those who had previously constituted the coun- 
try's substantial middle class joined the unemployed millions from the 
working class in their abject exclusion from any and all forms of economic 
relations. Suburban mothers and homemakers (the caceroleros) marched 
through the streets in the hundreds of thousands, banging their empty pots 
and pans, alongside the piqueteros (picketers), long term unemployed 
labourers from privatized national industries such as oil and sugar cane, 
who shut down commercial traffic on essential bridges and highways 
throughout the country to protest de-industrialization and indigence. The 
common cry of everyone in the street was "Que se vayan todos!" (Get rid of 
them all!), a call for the expulsion of usurious multinational banks and their 
own treacherous political class. On December 21, as banks were trashed and 
firebombed, and state repression of the people became vicious, de la Rua 
resigned as President and fled by helicopter. By the end of December 21, 32 
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people were dead and thousands were imprisoned, yet mass demonstrations 
in the streets continued, with the country on the brink of civil war. 
By January 1, 2002, after three interim Presidents, all beleaguered by 
prolonged mass demonstrations and violent attacks on Congress itself, had 
come and gone in ten days, with some holding office for just hours, the 
Congress appointed Buenos Aires Peronist Senator Duhalde as president 
until new elections could be held in 2003. A member of the same party as 
former President Menem but diametrically opposed to Menem's free mar- 
ket ideology and practices, Duhalde managed to construct a fragile con- 
gressional consensus and has remained in power. Given the traditional 
concentrationist form of presidency in Argentina, as well as the specific 
condition of an undemocratic appointment during a state of emergency, 
enormous powers were centralized in this presidency. On the civil front, 
Duhalde attempted to defuse the violence by denouncing police repression 
and reining in the police to the extent possible, given that many of them 
were unpunished former torturers from the military dictatorship who 
moved to  local police forces after the return to democracy fifteen years 
earlier and now operated as rogue vigilantes, kidnapping, beating and 
killing citizens as they saw fit. On the economic front, Duhalde was forced 
maintain to the severe banking and currency export restrictions imposed by 
Cavallo, collectively know as the corralito (playpen). Once in place, these 
restrictions were next to impossible to get out of without provoking an 
even more devastating flight of capital. 
The new president's major economic intervention related to currency 
and asset valuation, as he unlinked the peso from parity and convertibil- 
ity with the US dollar and let it float freely. In 1991, President Menem and 
the ever-present Domingo Cavallo, then head of the Central Bank, insti- 
tuted the Law of Convertibility, where the peso was officially pegged to 
the US dollar. To assure international investors and banks of the nation's 
liquidity, this law required that every peso in circulation be backed by a 
dollar held in reserve at the Central Bank, effectively dollarizing the econ- 
omy. The dollar-pegged-peso initially produced the desired effect of bring- 
ing down an annual inflation rate of almost 5000%, but over time it 
produced serious economic downturns for Argentina. The US dollar con- 
tinued to increase in value on international markets, increasing the value 
of the peso as well, and rendering Argentinean exports unaffordable 
abroad. The currency-driven drop in Argentinean exports was further 
exacerbated when Brazil, Argentina's largest trading partner, devalued its 
currency by 50% in 1998, making Brazilian imports even cheaper and 
more desirable for Argentinean consumers. By transferring rampant infla- 
tionary pressures onto the fixed value of an inflated peso, the Law of 
Convertibility produced an economic bubble that was bound to burst. 
Throughout the 1990s, national consumption of imported goods grew 
dramatically, while national industries-many of which were established 
in the 1950s under Peron in his drive for economic independence through 
import substitution and nationalization of industry-collapsed in bank- 
ruptcy or were sold off to multinational interests. The Argentinean econ- 
omy stagnated and then began shrinking; the number of unemployed as 
well as the number of people living below the poverty line doubled 
between 1995 and 2000. During this same period of stagnation and col- 
lapse, the International Monetary Fund demanded drastic reductions to 
Argentina's public spending in return for additional loans to maintain 
dollarization measures. The September 5 ,2000 "Technical Memorandum 
of Understanding" between Argentina's Central Bank and the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund required Argentina to cut the government budget 
deficit from US $5.3 billion in 2000 to  $4.1 billion in 2001, provoking an 
even deeper recession by shrinking the key role of the state in maintaining 
consumer spending. In return, the IMF would loan Argentina just enough 
to pay the interest on its foreign debt, a promise that in the end the IMF 
did not keep. This was the unsustainable shape of the dollar and debt 
cycle that finally imploded in December 2001. 
Duhalde's termination of the creeping dollarization policy set up by the 
convertibility law deepened national economic recession as Argentina 
struggled to pry itself from the clutches of global finance networks. As the 
newly floated peso rapidly devalued to 30% of its former convertible 
value, the battle began over which currency-dollar or devalued peso- 
would be assigned to financial obligations contracted under the prior dol- 
lar-peso parity regime. With peso devaluation, Argentineans holding dol- 
lar-denominated debts (a commonplace, given that real estate was only 
sold and mortgaged in dollars and that dollar-denominated bank loans 
were offered at lower interest rates than peso-denominated loans) would 
be forced to continue paying that debt at  a dollarized rate, while their 
peso incomes (the currency salaries were paid in even under convertibil- 
ity) were worth 70% less. Multinational banks insisted that dollar- 
denominated deposits they held (savings and term deposits) would only 
be paid back in pesos at the convertible one-to-one rate, thus reducing 
deposit holders' assets by 70% and giving the banks an instant and mas- 
sive windfall profit in the same amount. Claiming hard currency reserve 
depletion, multinational banks refused to recapitalize local operations 
with parent company assets, threatened bankruptcy and demanded hard 
currency at discount rates from the Argentinean Central Bank. (Several 
banks, including Canadian owned Scotiabank Quilmes, were shut down 
by the state for exporting their reserves and liquid assets in contravention 
of the new banking restrictions.)6 Consumer costs spiralled out of control 
as foreign-owned private companies providing essential public services- 
water, electricity, gas, telephone-continued to bill at  a dollarized rate. 
Imported goods and services, which consumers had come to rely on, 
became prohibitively expensive, while potential national suppliers had 
gone bankrupt or were sold to foreign multinationals who now expected 
to be paid dollarized rates. The Argentinean state's international debt of 
$132 billion, held mostly in dollar denominated bonds by foreign banks, 
also increased by the amount of the peso devaluation. For over a year 
now, Duhalde's economic de-globalization and re-nationalization project 
has teetered along, attempting to clean up the debris from the ruinous 
global finance network model of debt capitalization, privatization and 
transnational integration as he extricated two currencies and a myriad of 
debtors and creditors from each other, while balancing the brute power of 
multinational banks with the immediate needs of a volatile public. 
In addition to the international implications of the debt and currency 
crisis, Duhalde and his successor, expected to be chosen in elections in 
May 2003, face an internal form of this crisis which is unique to Argen- 
tinean economics and debt structures. Throughout the 1990s, as Menem's 
brutal privatization and state shrinking program produced deindustrial- 
ization and massive unemployment, already indebted provincial govern- 
ments faced increased demands for services as their revenues disappeared. 
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Almost every Argentinean provincial government issued its own currency 
-vouchers, parallel money, funny money, promissory notes, essentially 
circulating debt instruments not convertible to either dollars or pesos-as 
payment for employee salaries and government contractor bills. In July 
2001, there were 10 such parallel currencies circulating in Argentina, with 
a total face value of $1.5 billion. Depending on the terms negotiated 
between the issuer and local businesses, some vouchers were honoured at 
100% of face value, others a t  30%; some supermarkets would accept 
them as payment, others would not. Until peso devaluation, most stores 
had three tills-one for dollars (almost always empty), one for pesos 
(increasingly empty) and one for the provincial voucher (the fullest). 
Some stores even issued their own parallel currency. After devaluation 
and an only partially successful effort to stem capital flight, the federal 
state faced severe hard currency shortages-both in dollar reserves and 
circulating pesos-and so issued the Lecopi, its own debt voucher to sus- 
tain economic exchange relations a t  a minimal survival level. When the 
face value of this third internal class of non-guaranteed pseudo-currencies 
is added to the international debt, Argentina's amassed debt (internal, 
external, provincial and private) rises to $211 billion. 
A macro periodization of this astounding and crushing debt is revealing. 
When the military dictatorship seized power in 1976 and launched a set of 
neo-liberal reforms to Argentina's highly nationalized economy - eco- 
nomic reforms accompanied by a vicious social engineering plan whereby 
almost 40,000 opponents of the regime were murdered - Argentina's for- 
eign debt amounted to $8 billion. The dictatorship borrowed freely from 
the IMF, the World Bank, and private multinational banks, institutions 
that promoted neo-liberal ideology and economic practices apparently 
without concern for the heinous human rights abuses. By the time the 
junta was defeated in 1983, the national foreign debt had ballooned to 
$44 billion. The Central Bank, recipient of all foreign loans and headed by 
the ubiquitous Domingo Cavallo, maintained no records of where or how 
these monies were spent; however, $1 1 billion in national capital is known 
to have fled the country during this same period. In seven years of institu- 
tionally sanctioned free market reforms and military dictatorship, 
Argentina's debt increased by 550%. Equally importantly, an almost insur- 
mountable democratic deficit was left behind. The democratic election of 
President Alfonsin in 1984 slowed further neo-liberal economic reforms, 
due largely to the new government's economic incompetence rather than 
any coherent political-economic plan to reassert the role of the state. Frus- 
tration of the economic agenda of global finance capital networks 
prompted international lending agencies to assess the country as a high- 
risk investment and to impose extreme interest rates on loans to the 
Argentina, setting off an insane inflationary spiral which reached levels of 
500% per month and eventually brought down the Alfonsin government. 
When President Menem assumed power in 1989, he inherited the existing 
$44 billion external debt incurred by the military dictatorship. In response 
to Argentina's economic situation, Menem implemented the Law of Con- 
vertibility to establish dollar-peso parity while assuming sweeping emer- 
gency powers and embarking on a radical program of privatization of 
national industries and slashing government spending, exceeding the 
demands of the IMF and the World Bank for neo-liberal reform. During his 
ten-year tenure as president, Menem privatized virtually all of Argentina's 
state enterprises for an approximate total revenue of $20 billion, received 
two IMF bailouts totalling approximately $60 billion, slashed government 
expenditures by over $1 billion each year, and increased taxes dramati- 
cally. Nonetheless, by the end of Menem's first five-year term the external 
debt had doubled to $88 billion and by the end of his second term it had 
reached $120 billion. The entropic massiveness of this black hole of debt 
alone caused it to bloat to $132 billion by the time of de la Rua's default 
in 2001. It is clear from this overview that Argentina's most dramatic for- 
eign debt increases occurred in periods of brutal free market reform and 
minimal democracy, and in the replacement of the military dictatorship by 
a dictatorship of global finance capital networks. 
In the absence of electoral democracy, shut out of both reassertion of 
national sovereignty by the political class and global market relations by 
multinational finance capital institutions, the people of Argentina trans- 
formed their united call of "Que se vayan todos" into new forms of local 
organization, resistance, survival and empowerment. Every neighbourhood, 
every workplace, every classroom, instituted its own asamblea popular 
(people's assembly) where the principle of direct democracy prevailed. 
Local initiatives ranged from establishing neighbourhood watches to pro- 
tect residents against police vigilantes to pooling food resources for collec- 
tive kitchens to feed anyone in need. Looting of stores for food was 
curtailed by negotiating a scheme with store owners whereby the asamblea 
would simply be given food by the owners for redistribution. Barter 
exchange became a commonplace replacement for currency based 
exchange and some neighbourhood asambleas even organized medical 
barter clinics where people would bring unused medicines from home for 
unemployed doctors to prescribe to those who couldn't afford them. In 
other instances, unemployed workers' asambleas organized take-overs of 
factories abandoned by multinational capital and established collective 
self-management structures to get them working and producing again. In 
conjunction with this local direct democracy survival strategy, public resis- 
tance to the political class and capital networks continued. Banks and the 
Congress were the object of regular demonstrations of all kinds, from per- 
formances to firebombings to suicide attempts. Mass marches of 
piqueteros became such a regular feature of daily life in Buenos Aires that 
new traffic lanes and signals were installed to accommodate demonstra- 
tors. On occasion, marches have boiled over into violence and repression, 
as in April of 2002, when piqueteros and students blocked the Pueyredon 
bridge between a working class Buenos Aires suburb and the city's com- 
mercial core; riot police shot and killed two student demonstrators, pro- 
voking the people to mass riots for several days following. 
Full out civil war has miraculously been kept at bay for almost a year and 
a half, and despite the popular call to rid the country of its entire political 
class, traditional electoral politics have returned to the fore. The expected 
election of a new president in May 2003-the current appointed president, 
Duhalde, is not running-is turning into a replay of the political-economic 
ideologies deployed in Argentina over the last five decades. The two leading 
candidates are from opposing wings of the Peronist party. Nestor Kirchner, 
a former provincial governor and skilled consensus builder committed to 
reviving the role of the state in national economic development, resource 
redistribution, and renegotiation of multinational market relations, occupies 
the progressive position in the Peronist party. Former President Menem, 
architect of the ruinous privatization and globalization bubble that burst in 
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2001, was required constitutionally to limit his first tenure to two terms 
in office, but he has now returned to assume control of the Peronist 
party's ultra-free market right wing. Menem is running on a repressive 
program of law and order and a promise to reinstate and complete his 
program of privatization and globalization. A convicted illegal arms 
dealer, and a pawn of US financial and political interests, Menem epito- 
mizes the treachery of politicians. 
In the polarized and volatile Argentinean landscape, it might seem ludi- 
crous that anyone would vote for Menem, but elections are clearly subject 
to undemocratic influence, as witnessed in the 2000 US presidential elec- 
tions. In fact, Menem has a longstanding relationship with the Bush 
dynasty.' In 1988, George W. Bush tried unsuccessfully to persuade out- 
going President Alfonsin to award a gas pipeline contract to Enron; when 
Menem assumed office in 1989, one of his first acts was to award Enron a 
$300 million deal for the pipeline. Enron subsequently contributed hun- 
dreds of thousands of dollars to George W. Bush's election campaign. 
Menem was the only Latin American politician in attendance at George 
W. Bush's inauguration. Another of George W. Bush's major campaign 
contributors was Tom Hicks, Texas Ranger owner and president of Hicks 
Muse Tate & Furst, a holding company involved in Citibank's Argentina 
operations and with $10 billion in assets world-wide, including majority 
ownership of much of Argentina's formerly public telephone and telecom- 
munications systems which Menem privatized and sold under monopoly 
terms which obliged the Argentinean state to guarantee the new owner a 
fixed and elevated rate of return on investment. Hicks and Menem are 
also implicated in a broad range of drug money laundering and off-shore 
banking scams. Menem's reglobalization program and his possible elec- 
toral success rest on his own integration into what another Argentinean 
presidential candidate, Elita Carrio, has referred to as a transnational 
"mafia state." Menem may well prevail in the planned 2003 elections, and 
if he does, civil war is a certainty. 
Any attempt at isolation or separation will mean only a more brutal kind of 
domination by the global system, a reduction to powerlessness and poverty.8 
Argentina's devastating experience of entering and exiting the inherently 
unequal and predatory logic of global capital networks points to a para- 
digm shift in progress, where the globalist logic of debt, dollarization, 
democracy and dictatorships is being reshaped. Argentina was one of the 
most "globalized" national political-economies in the world, but was iso- 
lated from global network logic with supreme ease-the global readily 
becomes its inverse. With Argentinean society privatized to such an extreme 
that the only things held in common were the marketplace and the modal- 
ities of exchange - lynchpin tenets of the "consumption as democracy" 
theory of successful globalization - the collapse of the marketplace pro- 
duced complete societal collapse. And in many ways, the global market- 
place planned for, expected, and dictated Argentina's default, devaluation 
and collapse, almost as a perverse resuscitation of and experiment with the 
antique Hobbesian notion of "the war of all against all." 
In stark contrast to this new phase of brutal global market triumphal- 
ism, the collective construction of resistance and self-management by the 
millions of caceroleros, the piqueteros and the asambleas populares 
points to an equally new scale and scope of response to this shifting 
global logic. Entrenched authoritarian concentrations of power (global 
and national) have and will continue to deploy the overwhelming power 
to exclude, disempower and impoverish, but from the debris of this dev- 
astation a newly defined collectivity musters its own emergent, self-organ- 
izing powers. Embodied resistance in Argentina offers us hope as the 
contradictions, paradoxes and ephemeralities of global finance networks 
rapidly resolve into unambiguous reality. 
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